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Abstract
When people flee conflict or persecution, a common pat-
tern is for most to seek safety in other parts of their coun-
try, for a substantial number to look for refuge in a
neighbouring country or countries, and for a smaller
number to seek asylum in countries further afield, perhaps
on other continents. If displacement persists and people
consolidate themselves in their territories of refuge, com-
plex relations will develop among these different domains
of what we may call the “refugee diaspora”: that is,
among those at home, those in neighbouring territories,
and those spread further afield. Each of these domains cor-
responds to some extent to one of the sites associated with
the three “durable solutions” that UNHCR is charged
with pursuing for refugees: integration in the country of
first asylum, resettlement in a third country, or return to
the homeland. Taking its cue from the burgeoning litera-
ture on diasporas and transnationalism, this paper ex-
plores whether the notion of “durable solutions” can be
squared with the transnational character of refugees. It of-
fers a simple schema for considering diaspora and transna-
tional relations, and suggests that transnationalism might
be considered in itself as an “enduring” if not a “durable”
solution to displacement.
Résumé
Lorsque des gens fuient les conflits ou la persécution, l’un
des réflexes les plus courants est de chercher la sécurité
dans d’autres parties de leur pays. Un nombre important
de personnes cherchent plutôt refuge dans le ou les pays
avoisinants et un nombre plus restreint cherche asile
dans des pays plus éloignés, voire même dans d’autres
continents. Si le déplacement persiste et que les personnes
s’ancrent dans leurs terres d’accueil, des relations com-
plexes se développent parmi les différents volets de ce que
nous pourrions appeler la « diaspora de réfugiés » : ceux
qui sont chez eux, ceux des territoires voisins et ceux dis-
séminés plus loin. Chacun de ces volets correspond jus-
qu’à un certain point à l’un des lieux associés aux trois
« solutions durables » que le Haut Commissaire des Na-
tions Unies pour les réfugiés (HCNUR) est responsable
d’appliquer : l’intégration des réfugiés dans le pays du
premier asile, le réétablissement dans un pays tiers ou le
retour au pays d’origine. À partir de l’abondante littéra-
ture sur les diasporas et le transnationalisme, l’article
pose la question à savoir si la notion de « solutions dura-
bles » peut être mise en parallèle avec le caractère trans-
national des réfugiés. Il offre un schéma pour examiner
les relations transnationales et de la diaspora, et suggère
que le transnationalisme peut être considéré en soi
comme une solution de déplacement « persistante », si-
non « durable ».
Introduction
W
hen people flee violent conflict or persecution, a
common pattern is for most to seek safety in
other parts of their country, for a substantial
number to look for refuge in a neighbouring country or
countries, and for a smaller number to seek asylum in
countries further afield, perhaps on other continents. Some
of those in neighbouring countries of first asylum may later
be resettled further afield, joining those who have gone there
directly. As time goes on, individuals and households, at
home and abroad, examine their prospects to see what they
can make of their situation, given the resources they can
muster. Decisions need to be made about whether to stay
put, move on, or go home; whether to keep someone at
home to look after the family house, farm, or business; or
whether to uproot the family members left at home and
reunite the family in the country of refuge. Whichever op-
9
tion is chosen, what began as forced migration may trans-
mute into other forms of movement as individuals and
households decide to go or to send members abroad for
family reunion, or to earn money, seek education, or search
for other forms of betterment. These new or mutated flows
may merge with prior migratory streams of labour or trade.
If exile persists and people consolidate themselves in their
territories of refuge, complex relations will develop among
these different domains of what we may call the “refugee
diaspora”: that is, among those at home, those in neighbour-
ing territories, and those spread further afield.
Each of these domains corresponds to some extent to one
of the locations or sites associated with the three “durable
solutions” that UNHCR is charged with pursuing for refu-
gees: integration in the country of first asylum, resettlement
in a third country, or return to the homeland.1 Convention-
ally, these domains have been seen as distinct, or sometimes
as stages in a refugee “cycle.” Taking its cue from the
burgeoning literature on diasporas and transnationalism,2
this paper will show that this conceptualization fails to
capture adequately  the  transnational character of many
refugee  households: for  example, it is  conceivable that,
either simultaneously or over time, a given household or
family may have members  at home,  in a neighbouring
country, in a country further afield, or moving between
these locations. This must have implications for policy and
practice in relation to integration, resettlement, repatria-
tion, and efforts to resolve conflicts at home.
The paper looks at whether the notion of “durable solu-
tions” can be squared with the transnational character of
refugees. It offers a simple schema for considering refugee
diaspora and transnational  relations, and then explores
how transnationalism might be considered in itself as an
“enduring” if not a “durable” solution to displacement.
Durable Solutions or Transnational Relations?
According to UNHCR’s Statute, the organization is man-
dated to “assume the function of providing international
protection . . . and of seeking permanent solutions for the
problem of refugees” by facilitating “the voluntary repatria-
tion of such refugees, or their assimilation within new na-
tional communities.”3 In the latter case there were two
possibilities, usually termed “integration into the country of
first asylum” and “resettlement in a third country.” The
feasibility and attractiveness of these three “durable solu-
tions,” as they came to be called, have varied over time, partly
determined by geopolitical considerations: as many com-
mentators have observed, during the Cold War, resettlement
and integration were more the norm, because this suited the
purposes of theWesternpowers,whilesince theendoftheCold
War, new imperatives have prevailed and repatriation has
become the most desirable durable solution.4
In this thinking, displacement was represented as a tem-
porary phenomenon. It might be manifested in the form of
residence in refugee camps, often in neighbouring coun-
tries, or in the form of temporary residence, perhaps in
territories further afield. Only if exile became permanent
would there be local integration or resettlement: the refugee
might become an established resident, and eventually a
citizen of the country of asylum. Temporary status should
not last long in this scheme of things: either the conditions
that forced flight would be resolved and the displaced
should go home, or the displaced should be incorporated
permanently into their place of refuge. The three statuses
or “solutions” were linked to distinct physical locations,
and they were conceived, originally at least, as applying to
individuals rather than families or households.
Needless to say, the real world is messier than this ideal
scheme. First, as is well known, “resolution” of displace-
ment often takes a long time, which the architects of the
refugee regime did not anticipate. The displaced often find
themselves in a state of protracted limbo, a condition high-
lighted by recent focus on protracted displacement and the
“warehousing” of refugees.5 Citizenship may not be easily
acquired or reacquired, and is often disputed. People in
such circumstances develop ambiguous relationships to-
wards the places in which they find themselves. In various
ways, such has been the experience of the Afghan, Palestin-
ian, Somali, Sri Lankan Tamil, and many other “refugee
diasporas.”
Second, compartmentalizing these different categories
and statuses risks obscuring connections between them.
These categories tend to be regarded in conception, policy,
and practice as discrete and even as part of a sequence or
cycle comprising: displacement first asylum integration/re-
settlement/return.6 But there are links across time and
space among these places and statuses. As scholars of tran-
snationalism have been arguing for some time now, people
at home and abroad may operate in a single social field, or
at least in linked social fields. This applies as much in the
context of forced migration as with other forms of migra-
tion. What was a single household in a conflict area may
subsequently have members at “home” in the country of
origin; in neighbouring countries of first asylum; and in the
wider diaspora, in countries of asylum or resettlement: we
might term this a transnational household. Among wider,
extended families, those at home may provide financial or
other support for those who go abroad to seek asylum, and
those already abroad may help newcomers. Once estab-
lished, those abroad may support those at home through
remittances and other transfers. Refugees returning may get
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help from people at home, or from those in neighbouring
countries while they are in transit: such people may facili-
tate the return of those from further afield, either on visits,
or on a more permanent basis. These links obviously strad-
dle the domains outlined above.
Such links are even found in quite unpromising circum-
stances. For example, refugee camps are often rightly repre-
sented as sites of immobility or restricted mobility. But this
confinement does not mean that links with the outside world
are absent. As Horst has shown, camps may also be sites of
connection and link.7 People in camps, or at least some
people in some camps, are plugged into transnational net-
works. Telecommunication centres near or sometimes
within camps are concrete manifestations of this. The inhabi-
tants of camps use them to maintain contact with household
members or kin at home or in the wider diaspora, and to
arrange visits, transfers of money, and other transactions.
Such transnational connections among refugee popula-
tions are attracting increasing attention from researchers.8
As has been indicated above, schematically three domains
of a refugee diaspora may be distinguished—the homeland,
or place of origin; the neighbouring country or countries of
first asylum, which can be characterized as the “near dias-
pora”; and countries of asylum further afield, perhaps in
other continents, which can be termed the “wider dias-
pora.” At least three sets of relations may emerge among
these domains: between the “homeland” or territory of
origin and the neighbouring country of first asylum; be-
tween the neighbouring country of first asylum and the
wider diaspora; and between the “homeland” and the wider
diaspora. There may also be connections among the various
locations in the wider diaspora. Each set of relations con-
sists of movements or exchanges of people, money, and
information. Relations may be strong or weak and vary over
time, and by type: they might be political, military, social,
economic, or cultural. Moreover, these relations may be
ambiguous:  for example, transfers from abroad may  at
different times and in different ways both assist those at
home and help to perpetuate conflict.
Research has elucidated how some of these sets of rela-
tions work, but less attention ha been paid to others. For
example, the movement of people from the inner to the
outer domains as refugees or migrants has been well stud-
ied; so has the return of such refugees and migrants. Move-
ments of money and information have been studied rather
less, but have attracted more attention recently.9 Neverthe-
less, such research as has  been done usually presents a
partial picture; few studies have elaborated the whole or
offered an integrated approach. Yet a grasp of the “whole”
is needed, both to understand the societies concerned and
to help devise appropriate policy interventions.
To give some empirical substance to this schema, the
Somali, Afghan, and Sri Lankan Tamil diasporas each fea-
tures the tripartite scheme outlined above. There is a home-
land or place of origin, with a substantial population of
internally displaced people: Somalia and Somaliland, Af-
ghanistan, and North and East Sri Lanka. Substantial num-
bers of refugees have sought safety in neighbouring
countries—Kenya, Ethiopia, and Yemen in the case of So-
malis; Pakistan and Iran in the case of Afghans; and south
India in the case of Sri Lankan Tamils. Finally there is a wider
set of territories into which people seek entry, either directly
from the homeland, or via the neighbouring countries:
Europe, North America, and Australasia are home to the
wider diasporas of refugees and other migrants from So-
malia, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka. Over time complex and
enduring relations have developed among these different
domains of the diaspora emerging from a combination of
migration compelled by circumstance or pursued by choice,
as refugee migration transmutes into economic migration.
These three cases also show that political, economic, and
other relations are highly volatile, as the importance of
particular domains of the diaspora shifts over time. In all
three cases cited above, there has been substantial migra-
tion to the Persian Gulf states, but this has proved vulner-
able to historical contingency, most notably the Gulf crisis
in the early 1990s, when many migrants were forced to leave
the region. These shifts over time occur both at the macro
level of national and international political economy, and
at the micro level of the household and individual life and
livelihoods; needless to say, there is interaction between
these levels. At times, the near diaspora is an important
conduit of resources—economic, social, political, cultural
– while at other times this domain may be bypassed.
There are significant cleavages within and among differ-
ent domains of the diaspora. Very broadly speaking, spatial
distribution also reflects class distribution, for it is largely
(though not exclusively) the better-off who reach the more
distant and more affluent destinations, because so much is
now needed by way of economic resources and, increas-
ingly, social capital.10 The less well-resourced may have
sufficient resources to find refuge in neighbouring coun-
tries or to invest in labour migration; and the least well-off
stay within their country of origin. For those remaining
behind in the society in conflict, the scale of resource in-
flows from abroad obviously depends on the socio-eco-
nomic standing and resources of those abroad. The Somali,
Afghan, and Tamil cases all illustrate this.
Finally, the three cases show how transnational connec-
tions can help to fuel conflicts as well as ameliorate their
effects: for good or ill, Somali, Afghan, and Sri Lankan
Tamil exile communities have been essential bases of sup-
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port for those contesting power in the homeland. Whatever
their effects, however, the deployment of transnational net-
works  as a  resource is predicated  on reasonably  secure
attachment to the place of exile, for it is from such attach-
ment that resources and entitlements come: it is hard to
imagine how resources can be raised—whether for a house-
hold in distress at home, or to procure arms for a guerrilla
group — from a footloose, transient population without
such attachment to place.
Transnationalism as a Durable Solution?
If transnational activities across locations at home and in exile
are as pervasive as the experience of refugee diasporas suggests,
does the continued use of the categories “home,” “country of
first asylum,” and “resettlement country,” which accompany
the notion of “durable solutions,” make sense? Can durable
solutions be squared with transnational relations?
The notion of durable solutions has recently staged a
resurgence in the context of the development of UNHCR’s
Convention  Plus and  related  initiatives. In  an  effort  to
strengthen the international protection regime and reaf-
firm commitment to the 1951 Refugee Convention,
UNHCR launched the Global Consultations on Interna-
tional Protection in 2000. The outcome was the Agenda for
Protection, one of whose six goals was to “redouble the
search for durable solutions,” as part of reinvigorating
protection efforts.11 Convention Plus, announced in late
2002, was seen  as a means to these ends. It had three
interlinked strands:
• strategic use of resettlement as a tool of protection, a
durable solution, and a tangible form of burden shar-
ing;
• targeting development assistance to support durable
solutions for refugees, whether in countries of asylum
or upon return home; and
• clarification of the responsibilities of states in the
event of irregular secondary movements of refugees
and asylum seekers.12
Targeting development assistance was the strand that sub-
sequently made most headway, and in 2003 UNHCR
launched its Framework for Durable Solutions, aimed pri-
marily at promoting local integration in the country of asy-
lum or repatriation to the homeland through making
refugees’ or returnees’ livelihoods sustainable.13 The revitali-
zation of the notion of durable solutions struck a chord in
wider policy circles. Shortly after the introduction of Con-
vention Plus and the Framework for Durable Solutions, the
European Commission issued a communication, Improving
Access to Durable Solutions, which set out policy intent echo-
ing some of the themes of UNHCR’s Framework.14 These
initiatives were at the more benevolent end of the policy
spectrum in this area. Far less positive have been other ele-
ments of the containment agenda seen in much current
migration and refugee policy, characterized as the “interna-
tionalisation” of European asylum policy in a recent report.15
The resurgence of the notion of durable solutions has
thus been a significant feature of policy developments in the
refugee field. But while there is much positive about some
aspects of the recent initiatives, acknowledgement of tran-
snational dimensions across the sites represented in the
three durable solutions is weak in this resurgent policy.
As has been suggested, in areas experiencing conflict or
other severe strain, extended families often disperse to take
advantage of different resources at different sites. Some stay
at home, or become internally displaced, seeking refuge in
other parts of their country. Of those who flee the country,
the more vulnerable (perhaps the elderly, some women,
and children) may stay in camps where they have access to
health and education services. Other members of the ex-
tended family may go to cities in search of employment or
seek seasonal agricultural work; they may negotiate access
to land or livestock in the host country, or find ways of
maintaining control of their assets still in the homeland; or
they may find trading niches between town and country or
across international borders. Still other extended family
members may go abroad as labour migrants, asylum seek-
ers, undocumented workers, or through other migratory
channels to find work and incomes for themselves and the
family. Such “strategies,” if they may be called this, may well
be in place before displacement, but the portfolio of strate-
gies is likely to be broader after displacement, sometimes of
necessity, sometimes by new opportunities opening up.
Access to social networks and mobility can be among refu-
gees’ most important assets.16
From this perspective, the objective of discouraging “sec-
ondary movements” from first asylum countries to western
states, which is one of the imperatives driving Convention
Plus and other recent initiatives, may be counterproduc-
tive, since they curtail what may be an important element
within families’ livelihood portfolios. Likewise concerns to
prevent “backflows” after repatriation may militate against
cross-border networks that have been built up while in
exile. Refugees may not want to go back permanently to
their places of origin, but to re-establish their entitlements
and to integrate these assets into their networks of cross-
border livelihood activities.17
The lack of attention paid to transnational dimensions
in recent policy initiatives on durable solutions is somewhat
surprising given the prominence given to them in
UNHCR’s thinking, as evidenced in the research publica-
tions of its Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit. It is also
perhaps at odds with conceptual shifts within UNHCR in
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the 1990s, when the organization was said to have moved
from being “reactive, exile-oriented and refugee specific”
to being “proactive, homeland-oriented and holistic”:18
In contrast to the refugee-centric focus of earlier years, it has
now been recognized that if UNHCR is to discharge its mandate
of ‘seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees’,
then the organization must address the situation of people who
have been displaced within their own country, exiled popula-
tions who have returned to their homeland, and those commu-
nities which are at risk of being uprooted.19
Accompanying the shift to a “holistic” approach, the
relevance of transnationalism has also been recognized for
some time by UNHCR: “Refugee problems are by defini-
tion transnational problems, which cannot be resolved by
means of uncoordinated activities in separate countries.”20
This recognition of the importance of transnational
links is implicit in some policy interventions. For exam-
ple, a number of countries (such as the Netherlands,
France, Sweden, and Denmark) have instituted “look and
see” schemes, under which refugees may go to look at the
homeland without jeopardizing their refugee status: Bos-
nian and Somali refugees are among those who have
participated in such schemes. In some cases these initia-
tives have been government-organized; in other cases
non-governmental organizations have set them in mo-
tion.21 While  such  schemes  are  not without problems,
they partly overcome the compartmentalization of loca-
tions, and recognize and acknowledge the interrelations
between exile and home.
UNHCR and other components of the “refugee regime”
have then to some extent recognized the unavoidably tran-
snational character of refugee issues, the need to reconsider
conventional distinctions and categories, and the impera-
tive to recognize the links among different domains, includ-
ing those outlined schematically earlier in this paper. “Look
and see” schemes are one practical manifestation of this.
Perhaps it is time to go one step further and acknowledge
that transnationalism may in itself be a “durable solution”
for conditions of displacement—or at least an “enduring”
solution. This might mean considering the encouragement
or promotion of transnationalism. The cases presented
above suggest a number of arguments in support of such an
approach. First, “transnationalism” is arguably a “solution”
favoured by the displaced, since it is the practice often
pursued by them in everyday life. Policy approaches that
resonate with what refugees and migrants actually practice
make sense. Second, it is increasingly acknowledged that
remittances and other transnational flows tend to be an
effective means of reaching people in need, since they are
often one-to-one flows, rather than the more generalized
distributions implemented through aid or welfare — al-
though there are obvious issues of equity here, not least
between those households with migrants abroad and those
without. Third, as is increasingly recognized, diaspora con-
nections may be vital in sustaining societies in upheaval or
conflict and have the potential for assisting such societies
once conflict lessens. Building on such potential involves
understanding that the return of some members of a house-
hold or community to a “post-conflict” society may be
predicated on others staying abroad. That way the viabil-
ity or durability of the return would be enhanced: by
sending money home, for example, those abroad may
help to set up or sustain livelihoods established by re-
turnees during start-up periods or during hard times. A
sustainable livelihood may then be established as the
basis for subsequent returns of the displaced. At the same
time, as has been suggested above, the deployment of
transnational connections in such ways is predicated on
some elements of the diaspora attaining reasonably se-
cure residence in the place of exile.
There are, of course, problems with such an approach.
Not least of these are questions of equity, already referred
to, for it tends to be those who are already better off who
take prime positions in the transnational arena: encourage-
ment of transnationalism may therefore reinforce inequali-
ties. Another issue is commitment to place, also just
referred to, for if people are really as footloose as some
proponents of transnationalism imply, why should they
contribute to the places they find themselves in? This may
indeed be problematic for host countries where migrants’
or newcomers’ loyalties lie elsewhere. A third issue is the
ambiguity of transnational connections, since they can con-
tribute to conflicts as well as ameliorating their effects, as is
indicated by the cases considered above. Can (or should)
policies be devised which enhance the positive outcomes of
transnational networks, while discouraging transnational
activities which fuel or sustain conflicts?
These problematic areas notwithstanding, the implica-
tions of transnationalism are gaining greater attention
among  policy  makers and practitioners  concerned with
displacement and its resolution. Indeed there has recently
been an explosion of interest in the development potential
of migration, remittances and diasporas, including refu-
gees.22 This burgeoning interest in transnational dimen-
sions is ostensibly somewhat at odds with the resurgence of
the pursuit of durable solutions associated with particular
sites—repatriation to the homeland, local integration in the
asylum country, or resettlement in a third country. It is even




The  resurgence of the search for “durable solutions”
involving repatriation, local integration, and resettlement
in a third country is welcome, so long as we do not lose sight
of the links between the geographical locations and social
statuses that each is associated with, both to understand
how refugees and their networks function and the policy
implications of that understanding. One real-world mani-
festation of this is that interventions in one sphere may
reverberate in other connected spheres: for example, cur-
tailment of immigration or repatriation may lead to a de-
cline in remittances, which may in turn lead to hardship
and instability at home, and possibly renewed conflict and
forced displacement.
The challenge is to reconcile the quest for durable solu-
tions associated with particular sites with recognition that
transnational connections and practices provide important
means for sustaining people caught up in conflict, displace-
ment, and its aftermath. “Reconstruction” after conflict will
not only involve the homeland or the actual arena of con-
flict; transnational links and diaspora connections that de-
velop to sustain societies in conflict are likely to be
irrevocably integral parts of the “post-conflict” society to
be reconstructed. Taking advantage of transnational con-
nections and practices requires taking account of the links
among different domains of diaspora: this paper has offered
the beginnings of a simple framework for considering the
relations among these different domains, and has argued
that policies seeking durable solutions for refugees should
embrace those linkages.
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